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Digging for the Digital Dirt:
Discovery and Use of Evidence from
Social Media Sites
John G. Browning*
"The Internet has opened new channels of communication and self-ex-
pression .... Countless individuals use message boards, date matching sites,
interactive social networks, blog hosting services, and video sharing websites
to make themselves and their ideas visible to the world. While such in-
termediaries enable the user-driven digital age, they also create new legal
problems."
-Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com,
LLC 489 F.3d 921, 924 (9th Cir. 2007).
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine encountering the following scenario during the litigation fol-
lowing an industrial accident: just as an expert witness is explaining how all
required safety protocols and procedures were diligently followed, opposing
counsel confronts him with postings from YouTube videos shot by some of
the defendant company's own employees showing how they cut corners. Or
perhaps the defendant driver in a devastating accident denies that he was in a
hurry and not paying attention, only to be confronted with his own tweets
about being behind schedule. For plaintiff's counsel, consider the sinking
feeling when your client, a grieving widow who has just finished testifying
about the void left by the loss of her husband, is impeached with salacious
photos and postings from her boyfriend's MySpace page-all of which are
dated months before the accident in which her husband was killed. And of
course, there is nothing quite like the look on the face of a "severely and
permanently injured" plaintiff who has spun his tale of woe for the jury about
barely being able to walk and who now has to explain the photos from his
Facebook page depicting his completion of a recent 10k run or a mountain
climb in the Pacific Northwest.
Scenarios like these are occurring with increasing frequency in civil liti-
gation-thanks not only to the explosive growth in and sheer pervasiveness
of social media, but also to the legal profession's eagerness to exploit the
treasure trove of information to be mined from social networking sites.
Roughly half of Internet users in the United States have a profile on a social
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networking site., According to a recent Nielsen survey, individuals devote
22.7% of their online time to social networking.2 Not only does this reflect
an increase of 43% over the previous year, it also shows that social network-
ing usage is growing more rapidly than any other online activity.3 Facebook,
founded in 2004 by Mark Zuckerberg as a way for Harvard University stu-
dents to stay in touch, now boasts 600 million users. 4 Roughly half of all
Facebook users visit the site at least once a day. 5 In March 2010, Facebook
surpassed Google as the most-visited website in the world.6 In December
2010 alone, Americans spent 49.3 billion minutes on Facebook.7
The social networking/micro-blogging site Twitter-which allows its
users to "tweet" updates of up to 140 characters directly from their cell
phones and other wireless devices-was founded in 2006.8 Lured by such
immediacy and simplicity, Twitter's ranks quickly swelled to 190 million
users.9 The site went from handling 20,000 tweets a day in 2007 to a stag-
gering 65 million a day by 2010.10 Even a site that bills itself as more profes-
sional and business-oriented, Linkedln, has over 90 million members."
1. The Infinite Dial 2010: Digital Platforms and the Future of Radio, EDISON
RES. & AR3ITRON, (Apr. 8, 2010), http://www.edisonresearch.con1homel
archives/2010/04/the-infinitedial_2010_digital-platforms and the futureof
_r.php.
2. What Americans Do Online: Social Media and Games Dominate Activity, NIEL-
SEN WIRE, Aug. 2, 2010, http://blog.nielsen.com/nielsenwire/online-mobile/
what-americans-do-online-socialmedia-and-games-dominate-activity/.
3. Id.
4. Nicholas Carson, Facebook Has More Than 600 Million Users, Goldman Tells
Clients, BUSINESS INSIDER, (Jan. 5, 2011), http://www.businessinsider.com/
facebook-has-more-than-600-mill ion-users-goldman-tells-clients-2011 - 1.
5. Julianne Pepitone, Facebook CEO has "made every mistake you can make,"
CNNMONEY.COM, (Nov. 16, 2010), http://money.cnn.com/2010/11/16/technol-
ogy/zuckerberg-facebookweb2/index.htm.
6. Julianne Pepitone, Facebook Traffic Tops Google For the Week,
CNNMONEY.COM, (Mar. 16, 2010), http://money.cnn.com/2010/03/I6/technol-
ogy/facebook-mostvisited/.
7. Facebook's Fast U.S. Growth Begins to Slow, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan.
23, 2011, at 3D.
8. Dominic Rushe, How Twitter Has Become the People's Voice on the Eve of Its




11. Brenton Cordeiro, Linkedin Plans to Raise up to $175 Million in IPO,
REUTERS, (Jan. 28, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/01/28/us-
linkedin-ipo-idUSTRE70Q8UA20110128.
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Given this abundance of photos, video, statements, and other content
flooding social networking sites, it is hardly surprising to find lawyers from
virtually all areas of practice digging for such digital dirt. A February 2010
study conducted by the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers re-
vealed that 81% of the attorneys responding reported finding and using evi-
dence from social networking sites in their cases.12 The most popular source
of such information was Facebook, with 66% of all respondents indicating
that they had found evidence on that site.'3 Prosecutors and criminal-defense
attorneys alike have located useful-and sometimes case-making-informa-
tion from social networking sites, as have family-law practitioners, personal-
injury and products-liability specialists, employment lawyers, intellectual-
property attorneys, defamation and media lawyers, insurance-coverage prac-
titioners, and even securities litigators. The ranks of lawyers monitoring sites
like Facebook and MySpace for useful tidbits of information encompass both
the public and private sectors, and include not only outside counsel but in-
house lawyers as well. In fact, a 2009 LexisNexis survey of corporate coun-
sel revealed that use of social networks by those working in corporate legal
departments had increased approximately 25% in 2009.14
Social media's inexorable spread across state, national, and even inter-
national boundaries, along with the Internet's transformative effect on how
people conduct business, is changing traditional notions of jurisdiction. As
one court observed, the Internet "makes it possible to conduct business
throughout the world entirely from a desk top."15 Courts across the country
have wrestled with whether or not threatening YouTube videos, allegedly
defamatory statements on LiveJournal, and even MySpace messages have
been sufficient to warrant subjecting individuals in one state to a court's ju-
risdiction in another.16
As new media provides ever-increasing access to information that was
once thought unavailable-and does so with the speed of a search engine-
lawyers and courts have had to confront new problems in presenting cases.
12. Big Surge in Social Networking Evidence Says Survey of Nation's Top Divorce
Lawyers, Facebook is Primary Source for Compromising Information, AMERI-




14. Survey Reveals Substantial Growth in Online Social Networking by Lawyers
Over the Past Year, LEXISNEXIS PRODUCT CORNER, (Oct. 15, 2009), http://
www.lexisnexis.com/community/ideas/blogs/product-corner/archive/2009/1 0/
15/survey-reveals-socialnetworking-growth- .aspx.
15. Jones v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 995 S.W.2d 767, 772 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1999, pet. dism'd w.o.j. [mand. denied]).
16. See, e.g., Penachio v. Benedict, 2010 WL 4505996, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 9,
2010); Miller v. Kelly, 2010 WL 4684029, at *1 (D. Colo. Nov. 12, 2010);
State v. Pierce, 792 N.W.2d 83 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010).
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Individuals who have long since grown accustomed to gathering news and
information on everything from restaurant reviews to medical advice online
are now populating the jury box. As a result, jurors are venturing online in
increasing numbers to look up legal terms, view crime scenes on Google
Earth, comment on the proceedings via Facebook, or even communicate with
parties and witnesses through social media. Such online misconduct by
"Googling jurors" has resulted in an alarming number of mistrials and over-
turned verdicts in recent years, prompting a number of states (including, most
recently, Texas) to revise their jury instructions to address social media limi-
tations.17 By the same token, lawyers are exploiting people's tendency to
reveal their online selves by scouring social media sites as part of the jury
selection process-from voir dire to "voir Google," if you will.' 8
Litigators have seen evidence from social networking sites prove crucial
in all kinds of cases-not just the incriminating Facebook statements of a
criminal defendant, or the damaging Twitterpics or YouTube video in a bitter
child-custody battle. Glowing testimonials on LinkedIn can make or break
an employment case. Customer reviews and comments posted on social me-
dia sites have formed the evidence of likelihood of confusion that is so piv-
otal in trademark-infringement litigation.19 Postings, and even something as
seemingly trivial as a friend request, have surfaced in product-liability, insur-
ance-coverage matters, and even securities litigation. In some instances,
judges are not even waiting for parties to bring such evidence to them, but
instead are taking judicial notice of it themselves. In one case, for example, a
Social Security disability claimant sought additional benefits because of
asthma.20 After the Commission of Social Security denied the claim, an ad-
ministrative-law judge upheld it and denied the claimant's appeal, finding
that his symptoms were not credible.21 The judge noted that, "in the course
of its own research, it discovered one profile on what is believed to be Plain-
tiff's Facebook page where she appears to be smoking . . . . If accurately
depicted, Plaintiff's credibility is justifiably suspect."22
17. Brian Grow, As Jurors Go Online, U.S. Trials Go Off Track, REUTERS, (Dec. 8,
2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/1 2/08/us-internet-ijurors-idUSTRE
6B74Z820101208 (shows that since 1999, there have been at least 90 reported
decisions involving verdicts challenged as a result of Internet-related juror
misconduct).
18. Ana Campoy & Ashby Jones, Searching for Details Online, Lawyers Facebook
the Jury, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, (Feb. 22, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/
article/SB 10001424052748703561604576150841297191886.html.
19. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc. v. Chipotles Grill of Jonesboro, Inc., 2011 WL
2292357, at *4 (E.D. Ark. June 9, 2011).
20. Purvis v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 2011 WL 741234, at *1 (D. N.J. Feb. 23,
2011).
21. Id.
22. Id. at *7 n.4.
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With the expanding use of social media evidence by lawyers, of course,
come new professional risks and pitfalls. Attorneys must remain mindful of
the fact that existing ethical rules apply to communications in the digital age
as well. Lawyers have found themselves in ethical hot water for making
Facebook posts about a case, betraying client confidences, criticizing a judge
in blog posts, and sending tweets in which they link to sealed documents.23
Even victorious attorneys have found their social media posts about time
spent on a case and other issues sought during a post-trial dispute over attor-
ney's fees.24 And, as is discussed at greater length elsewhere in this article,
several bar association ethics opinions have been issued dealing with the eth-
ical questions raised by an attorney's use of social media sites while investi-
gating and litigating a case. 25
Clearly, the cultural tsunami that is social media is altering the legal
landscape. Less than 10 years ago, there was no cause of action for defama-
tion by Twitter, no crime of creating a false online persona, and it would not
have been possible to serve a defendant with process via a social networking
site-yet all three exist today. 26 This article will demonstrate that the body
of case law developed thus far on the use of social networking is instructive
on a whole host of discoverability and evidentiary issues, as litigants and
courts alike grapple with what can be obtained from an opposing party's
social networking profile, as well as how such content may be used in the
courtroom. Litigators in all areas of civil litigation need to understand not
only the types of useful evidence to be gleaned from social networking sites,
but also how to go about locating and obtaining such evidence, as well as the
authentication issues and privacy concerns that have been raised with respect
to the admissibility of content from a social networking profile. For lawyers
on either side of the docket, and across virtually any area of litigation, evi-
23. JOHN G. BROWNING, THE LAWYER'S GUIDE TO SOCIAL NETWORKING: UNDER-
STANDING SOCIAL MEDIA'S IMPACT ON THE LAW 149-63 (2010).
24. Muniz v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 2011 WL 311374, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 28,
2011).
25. See, e.g., Philadelphia Bar Ass'n Prof I Guidance Comm. Opinion 2009-02
(2009) (a lawyer may not use a third person who does not truthfully represent
herself to "friend" a witness and obtain access to that witness's restricted social
networking profile); New York City Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof'I Ethics Formal
Opinion 2010-02 (2010) (while a lawyer may access the publicly viewable
pages of another party's social networking profile, he may not engage in trick-
ery or misrepresentation in "friending" a witness to gain access to an otherwise
private social networking page); San Diego County Bar Ass'n Legal Ethics
Opinion 2011-02 (2011) (a lawyer may not "friend" the high-ranking employ-
ees of a party whom he knows to be represented by counsel).
26. See BROWNING, supra note 23.
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dence from what Professor Daniel Solove has termed the "permanent chroni-
cle of people's lives"27 can be a potent weapon indeed.
II. WHAT IS OUT THERE AND HOW TO GET IT
Courts have seemingly undergone a sea change in attitudes toward evi-
dence originating from the Internet. Just twelve years ago, a federal court
referred derisively to "voodoo information taken from the Internet," a source
the judge regarded "as one large catalyst for rumor, innuendo, and misinfor-
mation," concluding that "any evidence procured off the Internet is adequate
for almost nothing."28 In more recent years, however, courts across the coun-
try have come to expect that lawyers will utilize online resources for every-
thing from performing due diligence on a party being served29 to jury
selection.30 At least one federal circuit court has recognized that it is per-
fectly acceptable for a judge to confirm his or her judicial intuition by con-
ducting an Internet search. 31
Lawyers love "smoking gun" revelations, and social media evidence can
certainly provide those. Even popular culture has gotten into the act. During
a first-season episode of the CBS legal drama The Good Wife, lawyers from
the fictional Stern Lockhart Gardner firm were zealously representing a cli-
ent needing an emergency medical procedure on her unborn child, for which
she had been denied health insurance coverage.32 On cross-examination, the
defendant-insurer's lawyer confronted the husband and father about any mis-
representations he may have made when taking out the policy.33 After he
denied misleading the insurance company and acknowledged that on the ap-
plication he stated he was a non-smoker, the husband was then impeached
with photos from his Facebook page showing him smoking with buddies
while on a camping trip.34 With the speed of a search engine, the client's
health care coverage was gone and the judge ruled in favor of the
defendant.35
27. DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: Gossip, RUMOR, AND PRI-
VACY ON THE INTERNET 11 (2007).
28. St. Clair v. Johnny's Oyster & Shrimp, Inc., 76 F. Supp. 2d 773, 774-75 (S.D.
Tex. 1999).
29. See Munster v. Groce, 829 N.E.2d 52, 61 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (recognizing
the Internet as an acceptable means of "locating a missing litigant"); Dubois v.
Butler ex rel Butler, 901 So. 2d 1029, 1031 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
30. See Carino v. Muenzen, No. L-0028-07, 2010 WL 3448071, at *9-10 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 30, 2010) (per curiam).
31. See United States v. Bari, 599 F.3d 176, 181 (2d Cir. 2010) (per curiam).
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To begin the search for social media evidence, see if the litigant or wit-
ness-in-question has any social networking profiles. This can be done within
the confines of formal discovery, in which interrogatories are propounded
inquiring about the party's use of such sites, screen names, passwords, and
other account-related information. If it is preferable to proceed more infor-
mally, or if the subject is a witness or other non-party, conduct a search on
Google, Bing, or other search engines for any social networking profile, or
utilize search engines of social networking sites directly. Another option is
to go to a site like Spokeo.com, 36 which aggregates information about any
individual from many sites. If the subject is on multiple social media sites,
this search should bring up any social media presence the individual has.
If an individual's online profile is privacy-restricted, and the subject is a
party, more formal discovery efforts will be necessary. Assuming, however,
that the individual has elected to keep most, if not all, of his or her profile
publicly viewable, an abundance of information may be available. Studies
show that a majority of social media users either decide to allow these
profiles to remain public, or have an insufficient understanding of their pri-
vacy options,37 making informal discovery a viable option. While photos,
videos, and statements posted on a social networking site are what most law-
yers seek during discovery, the evidentiary value of other features associated
with such profiles should not be overlooked. For example, mood indicators
and emoticons are often employed by a user to share his or her current mood.
In personal-injury cases, the "smiley face" used by a plaintiff claiming to be
in serious pain or severely depressed can be used against them. In a New
York case involving allegations of police brutality, the officer in question
was confronted not only with his Facebook status update that referenced
watching the movie Training Day38 "to brush up on proper police proce-
dure," but also with the fact that his mood indicator had been set to "devi-
ous," complete with an angry red emoticon being licked by flames.39
Other often-overlooked features can also be used as valuable evidence
in a case. The list of someone's Facebook "friends," for example, can lead to
other potential witnesses or can itself serve as evidence to establish a wit-
ness's possible bias. Attorneys have also attempted, with varying degrees of
success, to use status updates themselves as evidence. In State v. Corwin, the
Missouri Court of Appeals upheld the exclusion of a sexual-assault victim's
36. SPOKEO.COM, http://www.spokeo.com (last visited Aug. 9, 2011).
37. See Alessandro Acquisti & Ralph Gross, Imagined Communities: Awareness,
Information Sharing, and Privacy on the Facebook, PRIVACY ENHANCING
TECHNOLOGIES WORKSHOP, CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY, at 13 (2006),
available at http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi= 10.1.1.73.2056.
(reporting that nearly half of Facebook users surveyed gave incorrect answers
when asked who could view their profiles on the site).
38. TRAINING DAY (Warner Bros. 2001).
39. See BROWNING, supra note 23, at 107-08.
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Facebook status update.40 In response to the victim's allegation of date rape,
the defense tried to introduce status updates from other nights to purportedly
demonstrate the victim's habit of binge drinking and inability to remember
events.41 The court held, however, that updates not "even tangentially related
to the events of the night in question" were irrelevant and were properly
excluded.42 In November 2009, an armed-robbery suspect in New York was
able to get all charges dismissed after his Facebook status update and other
corroborating evidence-like server records and eyewitness testimony-es-
tablished his alibi.43 In one Canadian case, a plaintiff claimed that he was
physically unable to return to his job, which involved office work at a com-
puter.44 However, the court upheld the defense's admission of the plaintiff's
Facebook log-on/log-off server records to demonstrate his extensive late-
night computer usage, thereby undermining the plaintiff's claims. 4 5
Even basic profile information, like one's contacts or employer listed on
Linkedln, can be extremely useful evidence. In a recent age-discrimination
case, casino gaming giant Harrah's maintained that it was not actually the
plaintiff's employer.46 However, in addition to showing that he received a
Harrah's employee handbook and paychecks signed by Harrah's personnel,
the plaintiff demonstrated that the primary defense witness-his supervi-
sor-denied working for Harrah's on the stand yet identified Harrah's as his
employer on his Linkedln profile.47 The judge found that the supervisor was
not a credible witness and ruled for the plaintiff.48
Many lawyers assume that directly issuing a subpoena to a social
networking site itself is the best way to formally obtain social media evi-
dence. In reality, social networking sites are notoriously resistant to such
efforts, perhaps due to the criticism and lawsuits leveled against them over
alleged failures to protect user privacy. Sending subpoenas to social media
sites raises privacy issues and Stored Communications Act49 (SCA) implica-
tions that will be addressed later in this article. As a practical matter, a re-
view of Facebook's view on its role in the discovery process reveals the
potential futility of such actions.
40. State v. Corwin, 295 S.W. 3d 572, 579 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009).
41. See id.
42. Id.
43. BROWNING, supra note 23, at 214-16.
44. See Bishop v. Minichiello, 2009 BCSC 358 (Can.).
45. Id. at 1 56-67.
46. See Blayde v. Harrah's Entm't, Inc., No. 2:08-cv-02798-BBD-cgc, 2010 WL
5387486, at *1 (W.D. Tenn. Dec. 17, 2010) (mem. op.).
47. See id. at *8.
48. See id.
49. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2712.
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Facebook urges parties to civil litigation to resolve their discovery is-
sues without involving Facebook. Almost without exception, the information
sought by parties to civil litigation is in the possession of, and readily acces-
sible to, a party to the litigation. Requests for account information are there-
fore better obtained through party discovery.
Federal law and Facebook policies prohibit the disclosure of user infor-
mation. Specifically, the Stored Communication Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2701 et
seq., prohibits Facebook from disclosing the contents of a user's Facebook
account to any non-governmental entity even pursuant to a valid subpoena or
court order. The most Facebook can provide is the basic subscriber informa-
tion for a particular account.
If a Facebook user deletes content from their account, Facebook will not
be able to provide that content. Effectively, Facebook and the applicable
Facebook user have access to the same account. To the extent a user claims
it does not have access to content (e.g., the user terminated their account),
Facebook will restore access to allow that user to collect and produce the
information to the extent possible.50
Facebook also charges a mandatory, non-refundable processing fee of
$500 per user account, an additional $100 for a notarized declaration from
the records custodian, and requires a valid California or Federal subpoena to
be served on Facebook.5' Out-of-state civil litigants must have their sub-
poena domesticated by a California court. 52 MySpace has similar policies,
but also requires more information than a party might readily have, such as
the "user's unique friend ID number or URL," the user's ZIP code, the pass-
word associated with the account, and the birth date provided to MySpace.53
Another obstacle one might encounter is that an attorney's idea of social
networking profile content is likely to be different from-and more extensive
than-the basic subscriber information or account information that a site
might be willing to release, albeit reluctantly.
The most effective methods of obtaining discovery of the contents of a
party's social networking profile are propounding specific, well-tailored dis-
covery requests to the party himself, or by having that party execute a con-
sent form or authorization permitting the holder to obtain such content
directly from a social networking site.54 In terms of discovery requests, re-
frain from being excessively global (i.e., "all contents of any and all social
50. Digital Forensics & eDiscovery Advisory-Facebook Subpoenas, CONTINUUM




53. Sam Glover, Subpoena MySpace information, LAWYERIST.COM (July 17, 2009),
http://lawyerist.com/subpoena-myspace-information.
54. See Joel Patrick Schroeder & Leita Walker, Social Media in Civil Litigation,
FAEGRE & BENSON LLP (Oct. 14, 2010), http://faegre.com/12201.
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media profiles of John Doe").55 Instead, be specific in what is sought, and tie
it to the claims or defenses in the case.56 For example, instead of just a
blanket request for all content, seek "all online profiles, postings, messages
(including, but not limited to, tweets, replies, re-tweets, direct messages, sta-
tus updates, wall comments, groups joined, activity streams, and blog en-
tries), photographs, videos, and online communication" relating to particular
claims, allegations of mental anguish or emotional distress, defenses, et
cetera.
Mackelprang v. Fidelity National Title Agency of Nevada, Inc.57 is par-
ticularly illuminating on the subject of what social media discovery might be
deemed relevant or reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissi-
ble evidence. Mackelprang involved claims of sexual harassment and a hos-
tile work environment, allegedly culminating in emotional distress so severe
that it led to plaintiff's two suicide attempts. 58 The court rejected the de-
fense's efforts to obtain discovery of plaintiff's MySpace content and private
messages regarding any of her sexual conduct or relationships.59 It ques-
tioned the relevance of non-work-related sexual relationships, reasoning that
"what a person views as acceptable or welcomed sexual activity or solicita-
tion in his or her private life, [sic] may not be acceptable or welcomed from a
fellow employee or a supervisor."60 However, the court did permit discovery
of the plaintiff's online accounts, any online statements referring to her law-
suits, any online activity around the time of her two alleged suicide attempts
and attributed to the defendant's treatment of her, and any information rele-
vant to her emotional-distress claims.61 Incidentally, the defense claimed that
the plaintiff "was voluntarily pursuing, encouraging or even engaging in ex-
tramarital relationships on or through MySpace."62 The discovery allowed
by the court revealed that Mackelprang had two MySpace pages: one created
just before the lawsuit was filed, in which the plaintiff identifies herself as a
happily married woman and loving mother of several children, and a second
page created around the time of the alleged affairs in which she holds herself
out as single and not wanting kids.63
55. See Rachel K. Alexander, E-Discovery Practice, Theory, & Precedent: Finding
the Right Pond, Lure, & Lines Without Going On A Fishing Expedition, 56
S.D. L. REV. 25, 65 (2011).
56. See Schroeder, supra note 54.
57. Mackelprang v. Fidelity Nat'l Title Agency of Nev., Inc., No. 2:06-cv-00788-
JCM-GWF, 2007 WL 119149, at *1 (D. Nev. Jan. 9, 2007).
58. See id. at *1, *8.
59. See id. at *6.
60. Id.
61. See id. at *8.
62. Mackelprang, 2007 WL 119149, at *3.
63. See id.
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With respect to having the party sign a written consent, the SCA allows
a holder of electronic communications like Facebook to provide the user's
records with "the lawful consent of the originator or an addressee or intended
recipient of such communication, or the subscriber in the case of remote
computing service . *.".."64 A properly drafted consent form should include
the account holder or user's name, any user ID, group ID, or known screen
name, along with the person's date of birth and address, including email ad-
dress. The consent should also include-much like a well-drafted discovery
request-a detailed description of what is being sought.
Finally, it should also bear the notarized signature of the person giving
consent. If the party/account holder refuses to sign the consent, one should
file a motion to compel and seek a court order forcing that party to execute
the consent. The usual objections to granting a motion to compel are rooted
in privacy concerns. And, as will be discussed in more detail, courts tend to
cast a jaundiced eye on claims that something is "private" when it has al-
ready been communicated to one or more friends on a social networking
site-even with privacy restrictions. Case authority indicates that a party
may be compelled to produce information from private online profiles.65 In
the event that the information produced gives rise to a belief that information
has been withheld, removed, or altered, consider requesting a forensic exami-
nation of the party's hard drive or wireless device. In Texas, for example,
such access may be granted, particularly if the party's conduct suggests that
the party may be withholding, concealing, or destroying discoverable elec-
tronic information.66
Gathering information from social networking profiles of those who
have restricted access to part or all of their page-in effect allowing only
designated "friends" to view private material-presents ethical issues as
well. May a lawyer, or someone working for that lawyer, try to become
someone's "friend" in order to gain access to private content? Of course, if
the person is a represented party (such as the plaintiff in a personal-injury
suit) the answer is a resounding "no." Rule 4.2 of the Rules of Professional
Conduct stipulates that a lawyer may not communicate, or cause another per-
son to communicate, with a person represented by counsel without the prior
64. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(3) (2006).
65. See, e.g., Romano v. Steelcase Inc., 907 N.Y.S.2d 650, 654 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
2010) (holding that evidence on plaintiffs online profiles was likely material
and necessary regardless of privacy settings); Flagg v. City of Detroit, No. 05-
74253, 2008 WL 787061, at *1 (E.D. Mich. March 20, 2008) (where the city
was compelled to produce the text messages of former Mayor Kwame Kilpa-
trick and the employee with whom he was having an affair on the grounds that
even the records held by an Internet service provider were within the city's
constructive control and custody). See also O'Grady v. Superior Court of
Santa Clara County, 44 Cal. Rptr.3d 72, 88 (Cal. App. Ct. 2006).
66. In re Weekley Homes, 295 S.W.3d 309, 313-16 (Tex. 2009); In re Honza, 242
S.W.3d 578, 581-82 (Tex. App.-Waco 2008, no pet.).
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consent of the party's attorney.67 But even if the individual in question is not
a represented party, an attorney must tread very carefully. Rule 4.1 of the
Rules of Professional Conduct mandates that a lawyer, in the course of repre-
senting a client, may not knowingly "make a false statement of material fact
or law to a third person."68
In 2009 and 2010, two bar associations' ethics opinions dealt with this
issue head on. In March 2009, the Philadelphia Bar Association's Profes-
sional Guidance Committee dealt with an inquiry from an attorney about the
propriety of asking a third party to "friend" a witness in order to gain access
to her Facebook and MySpace pages. 69 The lawyer already deposed the wit-
ness, learned of her social media presence, and concluded that her testimony
would be beneficial.70 While the lawyer did not ask the witness about the
information on her profiles or request access to them, the lawyer learned
through subsequent visits that she had restricted access to "friends" only.7'
The lawyer wanted to know if he could ethically have a third party "friend"
the witness to gain information to use against the witness without revealing
the third party's affiliation with the lawyer.72
The Philadelphia Bar Association's Professional Guidance Committee
found that such conduct runs the risk of violating several ethics rules, includ-
ing Pennsylvania's equivalent of Rule 4.1.73 Using a non-lawyer assistant,
such as a paralegal, does not relieve an attorney of responsibility for the
conduct of such assistants under Rule 8.4 of the Rules of Professional Con-
duct.74 The Committee reasoned that failing to disclose the third party's af-
filiation with the lawyer "omits a highly material fact," an omission that:
would purposefully conceal that fact from the witness for the pur-
pose of inducing the witness to allow access, when she [might] not
do so if she knew the third person was associated with the inquirer
and the true purpose of the access was to obtain information for
the purpose of impeaching her testimony.75
In September 2010, the New York City Bar Association's Committee on
Professional Ethics also weighed in on the same issue confronted by its Phil-
67. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (2010).
68. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.1 (2010).







74. Phila. Bar Ass'n on Prof I Guidance, Op. 2009-02 (2009).
75. Id.
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adelphia counterpart. 76 And, like Philadelphia, the New York City Bar's eth-
ics authorities pointed to Rule 4.1's prohibition against knowingly making a
false statement of fact to a third person, as well as to Rule 8.4's ban on
conduct involving dishonesty, deception, fraud, or misrepresentation.77 The
New York opinion took note of the increasing use of social media sites by
lawyers, and specifically mentioned potential ruses like creating a fake
Facebook profile or contacting a YouTube account holder to access a "chan-
nel" in order to view his digital postings.78 The New York City Bar Commit-
tee pointed out that pursuing such deceptive avenues was easier in
cyberspace than in person, and increased the risk of strangers gaining unfet-
tered access to all kinds of personal information.79 The committee took pains
to point out, however, that there are no ethical restrictions against lawyers
accessing publicly viewable pages of another party's social-networking
profiles.8O
In May 2011, San Diego County Bar Association's Legal Ethics Com-
mittee tackled a somewhat different scenario-that of ex parte communica-
tion via social media to a represented party.81 The facts involved a lawyer
representing a plaintiff in a wrongful-discharge action against a former em-
ployer.82 The lawyer wanted to know if it was permissible to send out
"friend" requests to two employees at the defendant's company, hoping that
these employees would make disparaging comments about the employer on
Facebook (a forum in which the lawyer felt they'd be more forthright than in
a deposition).83 The committee rejected the idea that friend requests are not
about "the subject of the representation" (and therefore innocuous).84 The
committee similarly swept aside the argument that "friending" a represented
party is no different than accessing an opposing party's public website.85






80. Id. Similarly, the New York State Bar Association issued a formal ethics opin-
ion stating that there is nothing unethical about a lawyer accessing the publicly
viewable pages of an adverse party's social media profile for "the purpose of
obtaining possible impeachment material for use in the litigation." N.Y. State
Bar Ass'n Comm. on ProflI Ethics, Op. 843 (2010).
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While the Committee, like its counterparts in New York and Philadelphia,
embraced the concept that a lawyer may ethically access and view public
social media profiles of parties other than the lawyer's client, it concluded
that the rules of ethics bar an attorney from making an ex parte friend request
of a represented party. Reasoning that "represented parties shouldn't have
'friends' like that," the committee sought to strike "the right balance between
allowing unfettered access to what is public on the Internet about parties
without intruding on the attorney-client relationship of opposing parties and
surreptitiously circumventing the privacy even of those who are
unrepresented."86
III. AUTHENTICATION ISSUES
Once social-networking evidence has been obtained, of course, the next
hurdle is getting it admitted. As with all evidence, the offering party must be
prepared to demonstrate that the content from a social networking site is (1)
relevant, (2) authentic, and (3) not subject to being excluded under the hear-
say or best evidence rules. 87 Satisfying the first and third prongs of this test
will vary considerably based on the particular facts of each case. With re-
gard to the authenticity requirement, courts have been reluctant to come up
with unique rules for authenticating electronic data. 88 In dispensing with an
appellant's contention that emails and text messages are "inherently unrelia-
ble" and would have to be the subject of a "whole new body of law," one
court noted that electronic communications could be properly authenticated
within the existing legal framework, since "the same uncertainties exist with
traditional written documents. A signature can be forged, a letter can be
typed on another's typewriter; distinct letterhead stationery can be copied or
stolen."89
Upon a determination that the information is relevant and can be heard
by the jury, Federal Rule of Evidence 901 requires that the attorney present-
ing the evidence make a primafacie showing of genuineness. 90 It is then up
to the finder of fact to decide authenticity.91 For example, in one commercial
litigation and defamation case involving competing providers of satellite-tel-
86. Id.
87. See Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 538 (D. Md. 2007) (ex-
plaining that electronic information must be relevant, authentic, and not ex-
cluded under the hearsay rules).
88. See generally Steven Goode, The Admissibility of Electronic Evidence, 29 REV.
LITIG. 1, 7 (2009) (explaining why "the existing rules of evidence are adequate
to the task of addressing questions about the admissibility of such electronic
evidence").
89. In re F.P., 878 A.2d 91, 95 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005).
90. Fed. R. Evid. 901.
91. Telewizja Polska USA, Inc. v. Echostar Satellite, No. 02 C3293, 2004 WL
2367740, at *6 (N.D. II. Oct. 15, 2004).
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evision programming, the plaintiff challenged archived pages of its own web-
site claiming that the pages originated from an unreliable source and were
not properly authenticated.92 The court rejected that argument, noting that
Rule 901 of the Federal Rules of Evidence requires simply a prima facie
showing of genuineness.9 3 The court concluded that, although the plaintiff
was free to raise its reliability concerns with the jury, the fact that an affidavit
declared that the pages were copies of the website as it appeared on the dates
in question and the fact that the plaintiff failed to deny or challenge the ve-
racity of the archived pages were sufficient to satisfy the authentication
threshold.94
Authentication of digital information can be accomplished by direct
proof, circumstantial evidence, or a combination of both. Federal Rule of
Evidence 901(b)(1) allows authentication by "[t]estimony that a matter is
what it is claimed to be,"95 while 901(b)(4) permits authentication by
"[a]ppearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive
characteristics taken in conjunction with circumstances."96 In the case of In
re F.P., the instant messages at issue were authenticated by direct proof-the
person in question acknowledged his screen name, admitted authorship, and
admitted to printing the instant messages from his computer.97 In another
case involving printouts of chat room logs, authentication was made by not
only the appellant and other witnesses confirming his screen name, but also
by the fact that when a meeting was arranged with that screen-name user, the
appellant showed up to the arranged meeting.98 Courts vary on the extent of
testimony required by Federal Rule of Evidence 901(b)(l). Some courts re-
quire testimony showing that the individual to whom the information was
attributed actually posted the information.99 For example, such testimony
could be proffered through an affidavit or a statement from someone with
personal knowledge, perhaps the website's webmaster.100 Another school of
thought is considerably more permissive. These courts find it sufficient to
have testimony from the person who created the screenshot being offered that




95. FED. R. EvID. 901(b)(1).
96. FED. R. Ev1o. 901 (b)(4).
97. In re F.P., 878 A.2d 91, 94 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005).
98. United States v. Tank, 200 F.3d 627, 630-31 (9th Cir. 2000).
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page on the computer at which the [screenshot] was made."01 Yet, some-
where in between the two ideas is another camp that requires different evi-
dence depending on the circumstances. An excellent primer on the
admissibility of all types of online information can be found in the case of
Lorraine v. Markel American Insurance Company. 0 2 Although this case re-
volved around the enforcement of an arbitration award and did not deal spe-
cifically with social networking sites, it contains a very useful discussion of
the admissibility of electronically stored information (ESI).103 The court
notes that ESI "comes in multiple evidentiary 'flavors' including e-mail,
website ESI, Internet postings, digital photographs, and computer-generated
documents and data files."104 The opinion analyzes particular types of digital
evidence and also examines authentication issues and hearsay concerns.
Printouts from a webpage commonly draw hearsay objections. Typi-
cally, however, courts apply the rationale that such printouts are not "state-
ments" at all, but are rather merely images and text found on the websites.105
In Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc., the court observed that the
pictures and webpages printed from the Internet had sufficient circumstantial
indicia of authenticity, such as time and date stamps and web addresses, to
support a reasonable juror in the belief that the documents were as they pur-
ported to be.106
To authenticate social-networking content, the party offering it must in-
troduce sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that the exhibit
is what the sponsoring party claims it to be. At a minimum, one should
proffer testimony from the person who performed the online research and
printed the social media pages. Testimony should describe when and how
the page was found, describe the circumstances of the search, and verify that
the copy accurately reflects what was viewed online. The webpage itself and
any page on the site reflecting its ownership should be printed out with the
URL listed. Further, one should be prepared to offer evidence that the author
of the posting or other social media content actually wrote it. This evidence
can consist of an admission by the author, a stipulation entered into by the
parties, the testimony of a witness who assisted in or observed the creation of
the content or other indications or content from the profile itself that connects
it to the author. One could also use evidence of similarities between the
profile at issue and other already authenticated material as circumstantial evi-
dence of authorship. One of the advantages of social media profiles is the
101. Toytrackerz LLC v. Koehler, No. 08-2297-GLR, 2009 WL 2591329, at *6 (D.
Kan. Aug. 21, 2009).
102. Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 538 (D. Md. 2007).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d 1146,
1155 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
106. Id. at 1154.
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level of individualization frequently associated with them-photos of the au-
thor, background information, information about his or her hobbies and inter-
ests, and commentary by the user. 07 As will be discussed further, such
individualization provides courts with a reasonable assurance under the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence 901(b)(4) that the distinctive characteristics are suffi-
cient for a jury to find that the purported author is indeed the one responsible
for the social networking page's content. 08
Courts considering the admissibility of evidence from sites like
Facebook and MySpace, as well as other forms of digital evidence, have
repeatedly noted that the evidence required to meet the authentication thresh-
old is "quite low."109 In State v. Bell, the appellate court affirmed the trial
court's denial of a defense motion to exclude printouts of MySpace instant
messages alleged to have been sent to a victim by the defendant under his
MySpace screen name."10 The court was not persuaded by defense argu-
ments that MySpace chats can be readily edited from a user's homepage after
the fact."' It found that the offering party may sufficiently authenticate the
MySpace content in question through testimony that: "1) he ha[d] knowledge
of the defendant's e-mail address and MySpace user name, 2) the printouts
appear[ed] to be accurate records of his electronic conversations with [the]
defendant, and 3) the communications contain[ed] code words known only to
[the] defendant and his alleged victims."112 Similarly, a Tennessee appellate
court held that admitting the MySpace printouts at issue did not require au-
thentication by a MySpace representative.'] 3 Here, it was sufficient that the
witness testified that her husband had sent messages to her on MySpace, that
she made printouts directly from her computer, and that the messages accu-
rately reflected the communication she had with her husband." 14 Most courts
are satisfied with authentication through circumstantial evidence of the con-
tent, location, and authorship of the social media content in question."5 A
few courts take the position that circumstantial evidence is an insufficient
107. See, e.g., Tienda v. State, No. 05-09-00553-CR, 2010 WL 5129722, at *5 (Tex.
App.-Dallas Dec. 17, 2010, pet. granted).
108. Id.
109. State v. Bell, 2008-Ohio-592, 882 N.E.2d 502, 512 (C.P. Clermont County Ct.
2008).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 511-12.
112. Id. at 512.
113. Dockery v. Dockery, No. E2009-01059-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 3486662, at
*6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 29, 2009).
114. Id.
115. See, e.g., People v. Fielding, No. C062022, 2010 WL 2473344, at *4-5 (Cal.
Ct. App. June 18, 2010).
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degree of authentication.,16 Still, others are satisfied with a minimal level of
authentication. For instance, a Texas appellate court upheld a minor's con-
viction for vandalism based on what the victim reportedly read on the defen-
dant's MySpace page, even though the victim had no personal knowledge
that the defendant herself had typed that admission.17
In addition, courts will examine the purpose for which the social media
evidence is being offered. For example, in People v. Goins, the appellate
court ruled that a MySpace entry had been sufficiently authenticated, but
upheld its exclusion at trial for the party's failure to elicit testimony inconsis-
tent with the prior statement made on MySpace.lI8 In one North Carolina
case, the appellate court upheld the trial court's admission into evidence of
an alleged child-abuse victim's MySpace page and reasoned that the minor's
posting of suggestive photographs and use of provocative language was
grounds for proper impeachment of prior inconsistent statements she made to
police about her sexual history."19 Similarly, in an Ohio statutory-rape case,
the court of appeals upheld the defendant's admission of evidence that the
victim had portrayed herself to be eighteen years old on her MySpace page,
the admission of photos that the girl had posted, and the admission of witness
testimony about the authenticity of those photos.120
In People v. Liceaga, a 2009 Michigan murder case, the trial court al-
lowed the prosecution to admit the defendant's MySpace page photos-some
depicting him holding a gun allegedly used in the crime-as well as others in
which he was displaying a gang sign, as evidence of intent and planning.121
The appellate court upheld the admission because it was allowed only for the
limited purpose of establishing intent and planning and because its probative
value exceeded any danger of unfair prejudice.22 In Hall v. State, a Texas
murder case, the court allowed the admission of incriminating statements
from Hall's Facebook page as evidence of her guilt.123 As proper evidence of
motive, the court of appeals upheld the admission of Facebook postings stat-
ing, "I should really be more of a horrific person. Its [sic] in the works," as
116. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Williams, 926 N.E.2d 1162, 1172-73 (2010).
117. In re J.W., No. 10-09-00127-CV, 2009 WL 5155784, at *1-4 (Tex. Crim. App.
Dec. 30, 2009, no pet.).
118. People v. Goins, No. 289039, 2010 WL 199602, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 21,
2010).
119. In re K.W., 666 S.E.2d 490, 494 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008).
120. State v. Gaskins, No. 06CA0086-M, 2007-Ohio-4103, 2007 WL 2296454, at
*7-8 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 13, 2007).
121. People v. Liceaga, No. 280726, 2009 WL 186229, at *3-4 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan.
27, 2009).
122. Id. at *4.
123. Hall v. State, 283 S.W.3d 137, 149 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009, pet. ref'd.).
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well as the admission of Hall's screen name, favorite quotes, and an online
list of her favorite films, which were notable for their violent nature.124
The Eleventh Circuit took a contrary position.125 Souksakhone
Phaknikone, who called himself "Trigga Fully Loaded" on his MySpace
page, was convicted in Georgia federal court of fifteen armed robberies and
sentenced to 167 years in prison.126 The trial court, over defense objections,
admitted Phaknikone's MySpace profile, along with various photos from his
MySpace page showing him brandishing a gun and bearing gang tattoos;
however, the court allowed the evidence with a limiting instruction that the
profile and photos could only be considered to prove intent or absence of
mistake, and not to prove that the defendant behaved like a gangster.127 The
Eleventh Circuit disagreed, holding that such photos were inadmissible char-
acter evidence offered for no purpose other than to show action in conformity
therewith under Federal Rules of Evidence 404(b).128 But while it disap-
proved of the admission of this evidence, it ruled the error harmless and
allowed the conviction to stand. 29
Time and time again, courts have pointed to the degree of individualiza-
tion that social networking profiles offer as a basis for satisfying the authenti-
cation threshold and, consequently, admissibility. For example, in the
murder case of Griffin v. Maryland, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals
considered the appellant's contention that the trial court had erred in admit-
ting a MySpace printout that was not properly authenticated.130 The printout
was a redacted page from a MySpace profile belonging to the appellant's
girlfriend, who had allegedly threatened an eyewitness via MySpace by writ-
ing, "JUST REMEMBER, SNITCHES GET STITCHES!! U KNOW WHO
YOU [ARE]!!"'3' The printout in question came from a profile bearing the
girlfriend's user name of "Sista Souljah," listing her birth date, featuring a
photo of her and the appellant embracing, and including a blurb of the appel-
lant's nickname "FREE BOOZY."32 The court held that such individualiza-
tion was more than enough to authenticate that the MySpace profile was
hers. 133
124. Id.
125. U.S. v. Phaknikone, 605 F.3d 1099 (11 th Cir. 2010).
126. Id. at 1101, 1103-04.
127. Id. at 1104-06.
128. Id. at 1107.
129. Id.
130. Griffin v. State, 995 A.2d 791, 806 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2010).
131. Id. at 795.
132. Id. at 796.
133. Id. at 807.
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Perhaps a recent Texas case provides the best articulation of how the
highly individualized character of social media profiles satisfies the authenti-
cation requirements rules for admission of evidence. In Tienda v. State, a
jury convicted the defendant of murder after an altercation with the victim,
David Valadez.134 The defendant's appeal centered on the supposedly im-
proper admission of his MySpace page into evidence over defense objections
that the social networking content was not properly authenticated.135 The
victim's sister found and testified to the defendant's MySpace profile, which
had a photograph of the defendant with the caption, "Rest in peace, David
Valadez."136 His profile page also had an embedded link to an audio record-
ing of a song played at the victim's memorial service, controversial and noto-
rious statements such as, "Hector snitching on me," and, "it's cool if I get
off," as well as defendant's photos displaying his electronic monitoring
bracelet, and another that captioned, "str8 outta jail and n da club."37 The
Dallas Court of Appeals found all of these, and more, as indications of suffi-
cient authenticity. It observed:
"The inherent nature of social networking websites encourages mem-
bers who choose to use pseudonyms to identify themselves by posting profile
pictures or descriptions of their physical appearances, personal backgrounds,
and lifestyles. This type of individualization is significant in authenticating a
particular profile page as having been created by the person depicted in it.
The more particular and individualized the information, the greater the sup-
port for a reasonable juror's finding that the person depicted supplied the
information."38
In short, the key to authenticating evidence from a party or witness's
social networking profile is to demonstrate the connections between that in-
dividual and the evidence being offered. For example, a distinctive nick-
name that doubles as an online pseudonym, photos depicting the user or
witness, comments unique to the individual, and references in the profile to
groups or causes with which the person is affiliated are all valid and effective
ways of showing these. More connections increase the likelihood that evi-
dence offered will be authenticated. Moreover, all of these connections can
be established through effective cross-examination. Remember, social
networking is all about establishing connections-and so is authentication.
134. Tienda v. State, No. 05-09-00553- CR, 2010 WL 5129722, at *1 (Tex. App.-
Dallas Dec. 17, 2010, pet. granted).
135. Id. at *4.
136. Id. at *3.
137. Id.
138. Id. at *5.
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IV. DISCOVERABILITY ISSUES - THE PRIVACY ARGUMENT
Perhaps the most hotly contested issue regarding the discoverability of
social media evidence has been the notion that content posted to a social
networking site is somehow cloaked in an expectation of privacy. Several
scholars have pointed out an inherent contradiction in the notion. They argue
that, although the Internet fosters a sense of anonymity for many, it provides
much greater freedom to spread information, which actually results in a
heightened likelihood of revealing what was once secret and private-to a
sometimes disastrous effect. 139
Although the very heart of social networking is the concept of sharing
information and connecting with others, time and again privacy is cited as the
basis for objecting to discovery into the content of someone's Facebook or
MySpace profile. Moreover, time and again, courts have brushed these pri-
vacy objections aside. The Sixth Circuit, for example, held that users of
social networking sites "logically lack a legitimate expectation of privacy in
the materials intended for publication or public posting."140 The Maryland
Supreme Court observed that "the act of posting information on a social
networking site, without the poster limiting access to that information, makes
whatever is posted available to the world at large."141 In 2009, a Minnesota
appellate court held that information posted on social networking sites was
deemed to be public information.142 In another case, a mother embroiled in a
custody proceeding objected to the use of her posts on MySpace, stating she
was on a "hiatus from using illicit drugs."43 The Ohio appellate court found
the posts admissible due to their public nature, and consequently, the mother
"[could] hardly claim an expectation of privacy regarding these writings."'44
Moreno v. Hanford Sentinel, Inc. is another example where the court
rejected the contention that postings on social media sites are private in na-
ture. In this case, a MySpace user posted a diatribe about her hometown.45
The online rant was found by another member of the community who wrote
an angry defense in the form of an op-ed piece in the local paper, quoting
liberally from the plaintiff's MySpace ramblings and identifying the plaintiff
and her family.146 The plaintiff subsequently sued the newspaper, claiming
139. See, e.g., SOLOVE, supra note 27.
140. Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 333 (6th Cir. 2001).
141. Indep. Newspapers, Inc. v. Brodie, 966 A.2d 432, 438 (Md. 2009).
142. Yath v. Fairview Clinics, N.P., 767 N.W.2d 34, 43-44 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009).
143. Dexter v. Dexter, 2006-P-0051, 2007 WL 1532084, at *6 (Ohio Ct. App. May
25, 2007).
144. Id.
145. Moreno v. Hanford Sentinel, Inc., 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d 858, 861 (Cal. Ct. App.
2009).
146. Id. at 861.
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this alleged invasion of privacy had ruined the family's lives. 147 The appel-
late court upheld the dismissal of the case holding that the facts contained in
the article, once previously posted on MySpace, were not at all private.4 8
One litigant has even tried to claim a "social-networking privilege." In
McMillen v. Hummingbird Speedway, Inc., the plaintiff was rear-ended while
taking a "cool down lap" after a stock car race at the defendant's track, and
he filed a personal-injuries suit.49 A few days later, the plaintiff posted ma-
terial on his social networking profile about engaging in activities such as
fishing and attending the Daytona 500 race. 50 Understandably, the defense
counsel wanted to introduce these comments as evidence for disproving
plaintiff's disability and damages claims. Instead of requesting the plaintiff
to turn over the relevant content of his social media accounts, defense coun-
sel sought the login names and passwords for each of his accounts.' 5' The
plaintiff claimed a "social networking privilege," which was resoundingly
rejected by the court. 52 In his ruling directing the plaintiff to produce not
just the content of his profiles, but also the passwords and login information,
the judge dispensed with the notion that social networking communications
enjoyed any degree of confidentiality.153 He wrote:
"[C]onfidentiality is not essential to maintain the relationships between
and among social network users, either. The relationships to be fostered
through those media are basic friendships, not attorney-client, physician-pa-
tient, or psychologist-patient types of relationships, and while one may ex-
pect that his or her friend will hold certain information in confidence, the
maintenance of one's friendships typically does not depend on
confidentiality."]54
Courts are somewhat more receptive to privacy arguments when the
rights of non-parties or minors are involved. For example, in one premises-
liability case, the plaintiff was a patron of the well-known Coyote Ugly bar
chain.55 In the typical Coyote Ugly fashion, the plaintiff was encouraged to
get up on the bar and dance, along with several of her friends. Unfortunately,
she slipped and fell, striking the back of her head.1s6 The defendant subpoe-
147. Id.
148. Id. at 862.
149. McMillen v. Hummingbird Speedway, Inc., No. 113 - 2010 CD, 2010 WL
4403285, at *1 (Pa. Ct. Com. P1. Sept. 9, 2010).
150. Id. at *2.
151. Id.
152. Id. at *9.
153. Id. at *10.
154. McMillen, 2010 WL 4403285, at *10.
155. Barnes v. CUS Nashville, LLC, No. 3:09-cv-00764, 2010 WL 2265668, at *1
(M.D. Tenn. June 3, 2010).
156. Id. at *1.
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naed Facebook for plaintiff's privacy-restricted content, including photos of
the plaintiff and her friends dancing on the bar.57 The court quashed the
subpoena, and the defendant issued subpoenas to the plaintiff's friends.158 To
resolve the discovery dilemma, the judge crafted a rather novel solution. To
protect the privacy interests of the third parties, he offered to create his own
Facebook account and "friend" the witnesses "for the sole purpose of review-
ing photographs and related comments in camera ...and disseminat[ing]
any relevant information to the parties."59 After acting as a privacy filter for
discovery purposes, the court would then close its Facebook account. 160
In another case dealing with a sexual-assault charge, the status of a teen-
ager victim as a minor enhanced the concerns over privacy. The plaintiff
sued the school, alleging that its negligence and failure to supervise contrib-
uted to the attack, resulting in the young victim's severe emotional dis-
tress.16' The defense attorneys sought the contents of the plaintiff's privacy-
restricted MySpace and Facebook profiles (both via subpoena to the sites
themselves and through discovery directed to the plaintiff). The defense ar-
gued the requested information was highly relevant to the issue of emotional
distress as it would "shed light on the plaintiff's credibility by finding out
what she wrote on social networking sites in unguarded moments."162 The
defense also argued that the plaintiff had waived her privacy rights to sources
that could lead to admissible evidence of a very material issue-her mental
state. Accordingly, the defense concluded that its request was analogous to
seeking emails and similarly discoverable communications.163 In contrast,
the plaintiff's attorney argued in favor of a broad prohibition against the dis-
coverability of social networking evidence in such cases, particularly where
minors were concerned.164 He maintained that the pervasive nature of com-
municating through computer or wireless device has somehow rendered mi-
nors, such as the plaintiff, to believe that the Internet allows them to
confidentially communicate with their friends.165 While the court did not go
so far as to adopt this "teen social networking confidentiality" argument, it
did decline to order the discovery. The court issued a protective order
against the release of the social media evidence, saying that "it seemed like a
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at *1.
160. Barnes, 2010 WL 2265668, at *1.
161. See T.V. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Educ. No. UNN-L-4479-04, 2007. LEXIS 3005
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big step" to order the release of plaintiff's private communications.66 How-
ever, in fairness, a key point for the court was the fact that the defense had
not yet pursued more traditional avenues of discovery (such as finding out
who the plaintiff's potential witnesses were and then interviewing or depos-
ing them), or shown that the information could not be obtained through other
means. 1
67
Other courts, however, have been considerably less deferential to a teen-
ager's privacy when social media is involved. In one such case, Tatum Bass,
a South Carolina teenager, sued Miss Porter's School of Farmington, Con-
necticut, claiming the exclusive private academy failed to adequately protect
her from bullying at the hands of a clique of girls at the school, and subse-
quently expelled her for absences caused by the resulting emotional dis-
tress. 68 Although the minor plaintiff acknowledged that part of her claims
rested on Facebook postings and email correspondence during her time at the
school, she hesitated, on privacy grounds, to provide the defense with the
requested social media evidence.169 Even though Facebook provided Miss
Bass with approximately 750 pages of documents, she in turn only produced
approximately 100 pages of that to the defense.170 Rejecting the plaintiff's
privacy arguments, the court ordered her to produce all of the documents.17'
The court made a point:
"Facebook usage depicts a snapshot of the user's relationships and state
of mind at the time of the content's posting. Therefore, relevance of the
content of plaintiff's Facebook usage as to both liability and damages in this
case is more in the eye of the beholder than subject to strict legal demarca-
tions, and production should not be limited to plaintiff's own determination
of what may be 'reasonably' calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence."72
The next cases move from situations similar to Mean Girls to another
all-too-common reality of the lives of some teenage girls: eating disorders.
Yet another court was required to balance the privacy interests of litigants
against the opponent's need for discovery. In a class-action suit brought
against a health insurance carrier over its declining coverage for eating disor-
ders, such as bulimia or anorexia, the central issue was a New Jersey law
166. T.V., 2007 LEXIS 3005, at *1.
167. Id.
168. Bass ex rel. Bass v. Miss Porter's Sch., 738 F. Supp. 2d 307, 323 (D. Conn.
2010).
169. Bass ex rel. Bass v. Miss Porter's Sch., No. 3:08-cv-1807 (JBA), 2009 WL
3724968, at *1 (D. Conn. Oct. 27, 2009).
170. Id.
171. Id. at *2.
172. Id. at *1.
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mandating coverage for "biologically-based" mental illnesses.173 Parents of
children suffering from these eating disorders sued Horizon Blue Cross/Blue
Shield (Horizon) for declining coverage, and Horizon took the position that
the disorders in question were psychological in origin, and therefore, not cov-
ered.174 Horizon sought support for its defense in the online postings made
by the children on sites such as MySpace and Facebook, arguing that produc-
tion of such writings on social networking sites would shed light on the emo-
tional roots of the eating disorders.175 The plaintiffs vehemently opposed
having to produce such online journals and communications, arguing that
doing so not only violated the children's privacy, but also would negatively
impact their recovery. 76 U.S. Magistrate Judge Patty Shwartz ordered the
production of the social networking content and later denied Plaintiffs' mo-
tion to reconsider.77 Judge Shwartz pointed out that the plaintiffs them-
selves elected to file a lawsuit that would require them to disclose
information concerning their children's eating disorders.178 As she stated,
"[t]he privacy concerns are far less where the beneficiary herself chose to
disclose the information. In addition, journals or writings that have been
shared with other health professionals who have treated the beneficiaries
shall be provided to the defendant's experts as they are a part of their medical
records."179
Plaintiffs raising privacy concerns have fared better when they have
been able to bring the circumstances of the case within the context of the
federal Stored Communications Act (SCA) and the protections that it pro-
vides.180 In Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., the defendant garment manu-
facturer was sued for copyright infringement of Crispin's protected work.181
Audigier issued subpoenas to a number of third parties seeking communica-
tions referencing its company between Crispin and certain other entities, in-
cluding a tattoo artist and sites such as Facebook, MySpace, and Media
Temple (a web-hosting and visualization-services provider).82 Crispin
moved to quash the subpoenas on several grounds. Crispin's most important
assertion was that the subpoenas violated the provisions of the SCA, which
173. Beye v. Horizon BlueBlue Cross/Blue Shield of New Jersey, 568 F. Supp. 2d
556, 559 (D. N.J. 2008).
174. Id. at 560.
175. Beye v. Horizon Blue Cross/Blue Shield of New Jersey, No. 06-5337 (FSH),
2007 WL 7393489, at *1 (D. N.J. Dec. 14, 2007).
176. Id. at *1 n.l.
177. Id. at *2.
178. Id. at *2 n.3.
179. Id.
180. 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (2006).
181. Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 968 (C.D. Cal. 2010).
182. Id. at 968-69.
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prohibited disclosure of the kind of electronic communications sought by the
defendant.83 The magistrate judge denied the motion, ruling the SCA did
not apply since the materials in question were not held in electronic storage
within the meaning of the statute. 84
The district court largely reversed the lower court's ruling, finding that
because there were actual messages and wall posts involved on Facebook and
MySpace, the SCA would apply because the social networking sites could
properly be considered providers of electronic communications services. 8 5
In a detailed, wide-ranging opinion, the court wrestled with the determination
of whether social media sites, such as Facebook and MySpace-with
Facebook's wall and MySpace's comments-were electronic communication
service ("ECS") providers or remote computing service ("RCS") provid-
ers. 186 Under the SCA, the two categories have differing standards.87 An
ECS provider cannot "knowingly divulge to any person or entity the contents
of a communication while in electronic storage by that service,"188 while an
RCS provider cannot "knowingly divulge to any person or entity the contents
of any communication which is carried or maintained on that service."8 9
One difficulty noted by the court, and likely to resurface in future discussions
of the applicability of the SCA to social media sites, is the fact that the stat-
ute was enacted in 1986, long before the advent of the Internet and social
networking.190 The court in Crispin found that a Facebook wall posting or a
MySpace comment would not be protectable as a form of temporary, inter-
mediate electronic storage, even though postings, once made, were stored for
backup.'91 The court concluded that Facebook and MySpace, at least insofar
as wall postings and comments were concerned, were ECS providers.192 In
short, the court quashed those portions of the subpoenas that sought "private
messaging" and remanded for an evidentiary hearing on the allegedly private
nature of the wall postings and comments.193
183. Id. at 969.
184. Id. at 980.
185. Crispin, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 981-82.
186. Id. at 980.
187. Id. at 972.
188. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(1) (2006).
189. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(2) (2006).
190. Crispin, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 971.
191. Id. at 988-89.
192. Id. at 989.
193. Id. at 991.
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The Crispin case was cited in a recently decided federal case in Flor-
ida.194 In that case, a plaintiff sued his former employer seeking back over-
time pay. 95 The employer subpoenaed Facebook and MySpace accounts
held by the plaintiff, presumably to buttress a defense that the employee was
not entitled to overtime because of hours whiled away on the social media
sites during working hours. 196 The plaintiff moved to quash the subpoenas
on privacy grounds.97 While the court denied the motion, it did so on a
technicality: the motion to quash should have been filed in the federal district
court in California where the subpoenas had been issued.198 The judge went
on to disagree with the defendant's position that Mr. Mancuso, an individual,
lacked standing to challenge subpoenas issued to third parties like
Facebook.199 Looking to Crispin's holding, the court came rather close to
articulating a privacy right for an individual, as far as his or her social media
information is concerned.200 The judge cited Crispin's ruling, saying that "an
individual has a personal right of information in his or her profile and inbox
on a social networking site and his or her webmail inbox in the same way
that an individual has a personal right in employment and banking records.
As with bank and employment records, this personal right is sufficient to
confer standing to move to quash a subpoena seeking such information."201
However intriguing and unsettled the potential application of the SCA
to social media may be, the undeniable fact remains that the vast majority of
case authority around the country-and the clear trend in jurisprudence-is
to reject claims that privacy concerns somehow trump a party's right to dis-
covery of social networking evidence.202 For example, in Ledbetter, et al. v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., the repairmen plaintiffs alleged personal injuries re-
sulting from an electrical accident at a Wal-Mart store. 20 3 These injuries in-
cluded skin burns, hearing impairment, fatigue, chronic neck and wrist pain,
sleep disturbance and anxiety, as well as "cognitive inefficiencies and de-
pression."204 The wife of one plaintiff also asserted a loss of consortium
194. Mancuso v. Florida Metropolitan University, Inc., 2011 WL 310726, at *1
(S.D. Fla. Jan. 28, 2011).
195. Id. at *1.
196. Id. at *1.
197. Id. at *1.
198. Id. at *2.
199. Mancuso, 2011 WL 310726, at *2.
200. Id. at *2.
201. Crispin, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 974.
202. See Ledbetter v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 06-cv-01958-WYD-MJW, 2009
WL 1067018, at *2 (D. Colo. Apr. 21, 2009).
203. Id. at *1.
204. Id.
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claim against the store. 205 Plaintiff's counsel objected to the defense's sub-
poenas seeking the claimants' records from Facebook, MySpace, and
Meetup.com on privacy grounds.206 Counsel also claimed that both physi-
cian-patient and spousal privileges applied to prevent the defense from ob-
taining the information sought.207 The lawyers asked the court to conduct an
in camera inspection of the information requested.208 In doing so, the court
found the plaintiffs waived their physician-patient privilege by virtue of
bringing a personal injury lawsuit and that asserting a loss of consortium
claim "injected the issue" of the marital relationship into the case. 209 The
court rejected the applicability of either privilege and ruled the social
networking evidence was reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence.210 Therefore, the court required the plaintiffs to dis-
close the information sought by the defense.211 The court further ruled that
an already-in-place protective order was sufficient to protect any privacy
interests.212
In another case, the court rejected these privacy concerns once again,
this time in the context of an employment-discrimination suit.213 The Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") brought an action on be-
half of two female employees at a self-storage firm. The employees, a prop-
erty manager and an assistant manager, alleged that they and other female
employees had been subjected to groping, sexual assault, sexual commen-
tary, and other harassment by a male manager, resulting in extreme emo-
tional distress.214 Counsel for the self-storage company defendant sought
discovery from the plaintiffs' MySpace and Facebook accounts. This in-
cluded profiles, status updates, photos, and wall posts that "reveal, refer, or
relate to any emotion, feeling, or mental state, as well as communications
that reveal, refer, or relate to events that could reasonably be expected to
produce a significant emotion, feeling, or mental state."2 5
The EEOC objected, claiming that the requests were harassing, would
embarrass the plaintiffs, and would improperly infringe on their privacy.216
205. Id.
206. Id.




211. Id. at *2.
212. Ledbetter, 2009 WL 1067018, at *2.
213. EEOC v. Simply Storage Mgmt., LLC, 270 F.R.D. 430 (S.D. Ind. 2010).
214. Id.
215. Id. at 436.
216. Id. at 432.
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U.S. Magistrate Judge Lynch, however, overruled the EEOC by ordering the
production the defendant sought. In doing so, he reminded the claimants that
"locking" or setting their social networking profiles as private did not shield
the profiles from discovery. 217 Additionally, while the social networking
content sought would have to be relevant to a claim or defense in the case,
the plaintiffs' allegations of depression and stress disorders were likely to be
discussed at length in the social networking communications being sought,
including when the stress purportedly occurred, to what degree, and what
factors may have contributed to or caused the stress. 218 As for the plaintiffs'
concerns, Judge Lynch disposed of their argument by pointing out that "the
production here would be of information that the claimants have already
shared with at least one other person through private messages or a large
number of people through postings."219
Like Magistrate Judge Lynch, New York Supreme Court Justice Jeffrey
Arlen Spinner does not believe the fact that a plaintiff has restricted access to
or even deleted content from her social networking profile should diminish a
defendant's right to conduct discovery efforts that include viewing the con-
tent of the plaintiff's Facebook and MySpace pages. In Romano v. Steelcase,
Inc., Kathleen Romano fell off an allegedly defective desk chair in 2003,
while working at Stony Brook University.220 She claimed to have sustained
serious "permanent injuries," including herniated discs, which necessitated
multiple surgeries and diminished her enjoyment of life.22' Among other
things, Romano claimed to be primarily housebound and bedridden as a re-
sult of the fall.222 Noting that publicly-viewable portions of Romano's
Facebook and MySpace profiles seemed at odds with her claims (she was
purportedly smiling happily outdoors and making references to physical ac-
tivities inconsistent with her tale of woe), counsel for Steelcase, the chair's
manufacturer, served Romano with discovery, requesting an authorization for
full access to her current and historical MySpace and Facebook informa-
tion.223 Romano objected on privacy grounds, arguing release of the infor-
mation would violate her Fourth Amendment rights.224
Justice Spinner overruled her objections, saying "Plaintiffs who place
their physical condition in controversy, may not shield from disclosure mate-
rial, which is necessary to the defense of the action."225 He ordered Romano
217. Id. at 434.
218. EEOC, 270 F.R.D. at 435.
219. Id. at 437.
220. Romano v. Steelcase, Inc., 907 N.Y.S.2d 650 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Suffolk Co. 2010).
221. Id. at 653.
222. Id. at 654.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 655.
225. Romano, 907 N.Y.S.2d at 652.
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to provide the requested authorization so the defendant could access Ro-
mano's social networking profiles, including any records that had previously
been deleted or archived.226 The court also swept aside Romano's argument
about having a reasonable expectation of privacy, reminding her that she had
voluntarily posted the very information she was now seeking to protect; since
the plaintiff "knew that her information may become publicly available, she
cannot now claim that she had a reasonable expectation of privacy," the court
opined.227 In addition, Justice Spinner noted that both MySpace and
Facebook maintained privacy and terms of use policies that cautioned users
that they post content at their own risk and at the risk of making such com-
ments or information publicly available.228 The court wrote, "Thus, when
Plaintiff created her Facebook and MySpace accounts, she consented to the
fact that her personal information would be shared with others, notwithstand-
ing her privacy settings. Indeed, that is the very nature and purpose of these
social networking sites or they would cease to exist."29
The common sense approach articulated in both the EEOC v. Simply
Storage Management case and the Romano v. Steelcase opinion is indeed
compelling. To paraphrase Magistrate Judge Lynch, one does not venture
onto a social networking site to engage in a soliloquy. Moreover, as Justice
Spinner points out, the sharing of information with others is the very reason
why social networks exist in the first place. While the potential SCA impli-
cations of messages sent via social networking sites will no doubt continue to
be explored, the trend in judicial consideration of privacy arguments over the
discoverability of social media evidence is clear: if a litigant feels that infor-
mation was good enough to share with his or her Facebook "friends" and
later asserts claims to which that information may be relevant, then the infor-
mation is good enough to produce to the other side in discovery.
Courts have similarly adopted a common sense approach when consid-
ering just what constitutes relevant social media content to which the seeking
party may be entitled. Two recent cases from Pennsylvania illustrate this. In
Piccolo v. Paterson, Bucks County Common Pleas Court Judge Albert Cep-
parulo denied the defendants' motion to compel the plaintiff to accept a
226. Id. at 657.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 656-57.
229. Id. at 657. Interestingly, two months after Justice Spinner's opinion, another
New York court took a different approach and affirmed denial of the defense's
motion seeking discovery of a personal injury litigant's social media profiles.
However, the court did so due to the overly broad nature of the discovery re-
quests and the lack of a factual predicate insofar as relevancy was concerned,
and it specifically left the door open for the defense to submit more specific
and narrowly-tailored discovery efforts for the court to entertain. See McCann
v. Harleysville Ins. Co. of N.Y., 910 N.Y.S.2d 614, 615 (4th Dept. 2010).
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friend request from defense counsel.230 The case involved personal injuries
claimed stemming from a May 2007 car accident. The plaintiff had ninety-
five stitches to her face, subsequent surgery to repair scarring, and was per-
manently scarred. The defense attorney wanted access to Piccolo's Facebook
page in order to view postings and photos, arguing that someone with a scar
on her face might portray herself differently online than she might when
seeking damages from a jury. The court rejected the defense's efforts, in part
because of the lack of any demonstrated need for access to Piccolo's
Facebook page.23' As the plaintiff's attorney pointed out, Ms. Piccolo's sta-
tus updates and pictures were not only already public, but she had previously
provided the defense with dozens of photos of her face, allowed the insur-
ance carrier to photograph her prior to suit, and even permitted the defense
lawyer to take more pictures at a September 2010 deposition.
In another car-accident case, the plaintiff sued alleging physical and
psychological injuries, including the inability to drive or ride a motorcycle
for extended periods of time.232 The defense sought access to Plaintiff's
Facebook and MySpace accounts. When the plaintiff resisted, the court
opted to conduct an in camera review of his social media profile.233 The
court concluded that while the bulk of the material was unrelated to the acci-
dent, and therefore not discoverable, a number of items should be and ulti-
mately were produced, including photos of the plaintiff taking numerous
motorcycle trips, photos of the plaintiff hunting, and various comments made
by the plaintiff confirming his continued interest in riding motorcycles. 234
V. CONCLUSION
The wall postings, YouTube videos, tweets, photos, and Facebook status
updates that populate the landscape of emerging media are more than just
what Jimmy Buffett might describe as digital "permanent reminders of a tem-
porary feeling." Social networking sites like Facebook, MySpace, Twitter,
and Linkedln represent a paradigm shift in the way people communicate and
share information. Such sharing, however, comes with a price. With in-
creasing regularity, lawyers are ready and willing to plunder the digital trea-
sure troves of information that these sites represent. Moreover, judges are
more and more amenable to allowing access to the plethora of photos, com-
ments, status updates, and other postings that many users of social media
might regard, at least in their own minds, as off limits. The shifting balance
between privacy rights and evidence gathering, in the context of a search for
230. Piccolo v. Patterson, No. 2009-04979 (C.P. Bucks County Pa. Ct. May 18,
2011).
231. Id.
232. Offenback v. Bowman, No. 10-CV-1789, 2011 WL 2491371, at *1 (M.D. Pa.
June 23, 2011).
233. Id.
234. Id. at *2.
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the truth, reflects the broader debate being waged not only across the legal
landscape, but the cultural one as well. At 5,830 words long, Facebook's
privacy policy may dwarf the U.S. Constitution, a paltry 4,543 words by
comparison. But in a society in which individuals live more and more of
their lives online, just how much privacy can one expect? The person post-
ing commentary and photos on Facebook today may very well become to-
morrow's litigant, hoisted by his own digital petard.
